HMS Cumberland was a Common Type, 74-gun, Third Rate ship of the line of the Elizabeth Class, built at the Royal Dockyard at Deptford, at the time within the County of Kent.
The Elizabeth Class was a group of eight 74-gun ships, built in two batches, of which a total of three were built in Kent shipyards, all in Deptford. The first batch of four was ordered between 1765 and 1768 and HMS Cumberland was one of two ships of that batch to be built at the Deptford Royal Dockyard, the other being HMS Resolution. The second batch of four was ordered between 1779 and 1782 and the only Kent-built ship of that batch was HMS Swiftsure, built under contract by John and William Wells in their Deptford shipyard. The Elizabeth Class was designed by Sir Thomas Slade, Co-Surveyor of the Navy and was a development of his previous Bellona Class. The Bellona Class had evolved through the Arrogant Class and the Ramilles Class, with each class of ships being an attempt by Slade to improve on his previous designs. The Elizabeth class were very similar to the previous Ramilles Class, but featured a more upright stem making the bows bluffer. Once in service, the sailing reports made by captains indicated that the ships were fast in ideal sailing conditions. The Elizabeth Class was to evolve into the bigger and significantly more powerfully-armed Mars Class of Large Type ships.
The 74-gun ship of the line was by far the most numerous type of ship of the line, not just in the Royal Navy and the navies of France and Spain, but also in the navies of other powers too. They were operated in numbers by the navies of Russia, Portugal, Sweden and Denmark amongst others. They gave the best compromise between speed and agility on one hand, and strength and firepower on the other. In British hands at least, they could and did go toe to toe against much larger and more powerfully armed opponents and still come out on top. They had begun to enter service in the Royal Navy in the mid-1750s and formed the backbone of the British battlefleet until the late 1820s. Some of them survived in supporting roles until well into the 20th Century. HMS Wellesley was sold to a charity, fitted out as a floating school and renamed to TS Cornwall. She was sunk by the Luftwaffe while moored off Gravesend in 1940. HMS Cornwallis was used as a floating jetty at Sheerness Royal Dockyard until just before closure and was broken up in 1957, while HMS Implacable (actually the ex-French Duguay Trouin, the last French survivor of the Battle of Trafalgar) was, like HMS Wellesley sold to a charity, fitted out as a floating school, renamed to TS Foudroyant and was scuttled in 1947 because the funds couldn't be found for the ship's preservation in post-war austerity Britain.
HMS Cumberland was ordered from the Deptford Royal Dockyard on the 8th June 1768. At the time the ship was ordered, the nation was at peace, with the Seven Years War having ended five years before. The Royal Navy was in the process of replacing older obsolete ships with more modern designs, within the constaints imposed by peace. Her first keel section was laid at Deptford on the 7th January 1769 and her construction was overseen by Mr Adam Hayes, Master Shipwright in the Deptford Royal Dockyard.
The Seven Years War (1756 - 1763) had seen the British inflict a devastating series of defeats on the old enemy across the English Channel both at sea and on land and the King of France was itching for revenge. His country had not just been humiliated by having to hand over lucrative overseas territories under the 1763 Treaty of Paris which had ended the war, but the loss of trade and revenue generated by those territories during the war meant that France had defaulted on her debts, which in turn led international bankers to refuse further loan requests meaning that come the end of the war, France was bankrupt. The Seven Years War had been fought on a scale never seen before and despite their overall victory in the war, the British Government's finances were also in a perilous state. The British Government's attempts to raise money in order to pay their own debts had sown the seeds of the next war. Attempts to impose taxes on their colonies in North America over which the colonists and their colonial governments had no say had led to protests and growing resistance and resentment across the Atlantic Ocean.
On the 29th March 1774, HMS Cumberland was launched into the River Thames and was immediately placed into the Ordinary, or fleet reserve. Although her hull was fully completed, the ship had yet to be rigged or armed.
Meanwhile, the situation in Britain's American colonies continued to deteriorate and in 1775, the first shots were fired in what would become the American Revolution or the American War of Independence. The British moved quickly to put down what had become an armed rebellion but the war became stalemated pretty quickly. March of 1776 saw the British forced to evacuate Boston but November saw them capture New York. The summer of 1777 saw the British take Philadelphia from the rebels but disaster befell them that autumn. On September 19th 1777, a British army under General Sir John Burgoyne won an expensive victory over the Americans at the Battle of Freemans Farm, part of the Saratoga Campaign. October 7th saw Burgoyne defeated in the Battle of Bemis Heights, also part of the Saratoga Campaign. Following this defeat, Burgoyne found himself surrounded and was forced to surrender along with his entire army. This was catastrophic to the British war effort. It convinced the French King to intervene in the war, thinking that with the British bogged down and distracted by an unwinnable war in North America, France could regain the territories and prestige lost in the previous conflict. In February of 1778, the Americans and the French signed the Treaty of Amity and Commerce and the Treaty of Alliance. Under these Treaties, the French promised unlimited funds, military and naval assistance in return for an American promise to fight for complete independence from the UK. These Treaties also recognised the United States of America as an independent, sovereign nation for the first time in history. A month later, Britain declared war against France.
The British would have been aware of the negotiations between the French and the Americans and of the increasing likelyhood of a French intervention in the war and had begun to mobilise for war towards the end of 1777. On the 29th December 1777, Captain Joseph Peyton was ordered oversee the completion of HMS Cumberland and to commission the ship for the Channel Fleet.
At the time that Captain Peyton was appointed to command HMS Cumberland, he was already an experienced combat commander. The second of three three sons of Commodore Edward Peyton, he had been born in 1725. He had passed his Examination for Lieutenant on the 4th June 1743. Mr Peyton was first appointed Master and Commander in the small Sloop of War HMS Savage of 8 guns on the 23rd March 1756 and was Posted or promoted to Captain on the 2nd December 1757.
On being appointed, Captain Peyton immediately set about recruiting a crew for his brand-new ship. His commissioned sea-officers were appointed by the Admiralty and the senior Warrant Officers, including the Standing Officers - those men who would remain with the ship whether or not she was in commission, were appointed by the Navy Board.
The ship's six Lieutenants were ranked in order of seniority, First, Second etc, based on the dates on which they had passed their Examinations. The First Lieutenant was clearly the most important of these and was the second-in-command and controlled the day-to-day organisation of the ship and her crew.
The Standing Officers were:
The Boatswain or Bosun. He was a man who had worked his way up through the ranks of seamen, with a great many years of experience of the sea. He was answerable to the First Lieutenant and was responsible for the operation, repair and maintenance of the ship's boats as well as her masts and rigging. When the ship was in commission, he was assisted by two Boatswains Mates. Amongst the duties of the Boatswains Mates was the administering of any floggings ordered by the Captain.
The Gunner. He was another man who had worked his way up through the ranks of seamen. He was responsible to the First Lieutenant for the maintenance, operation and repair of the ships main guns, the training of gun crews and training of Midshipmen in Ordinary in the art of gunnery. In action, his station was in the magazine, filling gunpowder cartridges to be taken to the gun captains by the powder monkeys. When the ship was in commission, he was assisted by two Gunners Mates and 20 Quarter Gunners, each of whom was a Petty Officer in charge of four gun crews.
The Carpenter. He was a fully qualified Shipwright who was answerable to the First Lieutenant for the repair and maintenance of the ships hull, frames and decks. When the ship was in commission, he was assisted a Carpenters Mate and had a dedicated crew of eight men.
The Purser. He was answerable directly to the Captain and was responsible for the purchase and distribution of all the ship's stores and provisions. While the ship was in the Ordinary, he was allowed to live ashore within a reasonable distance of the Dockyard.
The Cook. He was responsible to the First Lieutenant for the distribution and preparation of the ships provisions. He was also in charge of the ship's complement of servants.
The rest of the senior Warrant Officers were, like the Standing Officers, were appointed by the Navy Board and were:
The Sailing Master. He was the highest-ranking of all the ships Warrant Officers, was answerable to the Captain and so was entitled to live in the wardroom with the commissioned officers. He was a fully qualified Master, able to command a vessel in the merchant service when not employed by the Royal Navy. Of all the wardroom officers, he had the second-largest cabin, second only to that of the First Lieutenant. In a ship like HMS Cumberland, he was assisted by a more junior but equally qualified Sailing Master, known as the Second Master and three Masters Mates. Each of the Masters mates was themselves a Qualified Mate, able to work as such in the merchant service. The Master was responsible for the day-to-day sailing and navigation of the ship, training the Midshipmen-in-Ordinary in the arts of navigation and seamanship and the storage of supplies and stores in the hold to ensure the optimum trim of the ship for manoeuvring. In addition to the Second Master and the Masters Mates, he was also assisted by six Quartermasters, each responsible for the ship's steering and each assisted by their own Mate.
The Surgeon. Also answerable directly to the Captain and so entitled to live in the wardroom with the commissioned officers. Although not a qualified Doctor as such, the Surgeon had had to complete a seven-year apprenticeship which had been overseen by the Royal College of Surgeons and the Royal College of Physicians. He was responsible for the day-to-day healthcare of the whole ship's Company from the Captain downwards and was assisted in this by two Assistant Surgeons.
The lesser Warrant Officers were appointed by the Captain on the recommendation of the First Lieutenant after having applied for the posts and presenting their credentials. These were:
The Armourer. He was responsible for the storage, maintenance and repair of the ships stocks of small-arms and bladed weapons. A qualified Blacksmith, he would also manufacture new bladed weapons as and where necessary. He was answerable to the Gunner and was assisted by two Armourers Mates.
The Sailmaker. Answerable to the Boatswain and responsible for the maintenance and repair of the ships sails and flags as well as their storage. He was assisted by a single Sailmakers Mate and had a dedicated crew of two men.
The Ropemaker. Also answerable to the Boatswain, he was responsible for the storage, maintenance and repair of the ship's supplies of cordage and the manufacture where necessary of new cordage.
The Caulker. He was answerable to the Carpenter and was responsible for ensuring that the ship's hull and decks remained watertight. He was assisted by a single Caulkers Mate and seamen as and when required.
The Chaplain. An ordained priest, he was answerable to the First Lieutenant. In deference to his status as an ordained priest, the Chaplain was entitled to live in the wardroom with the commissioned officers. In action, his role was to assist the Surgeon's crew with the care of wounded men. In the absence of a Chaplain, the Captain would carry out his pastoral duties.
The Schoolmaster. Answerable to the First Lieutenant, he was responsible for training the Midshipmen-in-Ordinary in the theory of navigation and the associated branches of arithmetic. Where possible and appropriate, he would also teach the rest of the ships boys the basic three Rs.
The Cooper. Answerable to the Purser, he was responsible for the maintenance and repair of all the barrels stored in the hold. He was responsible for cleaning the barrels after their contents had been used, especially barrels used to store the ship's water supply and would be assisted by seamen as and where required.
The Clerk. Answerable to the Purser, he was responsible for all the record-keeping and administration aboard the ship and ensuring that the appropriate books were sent to the Admiralty for checking.
The Master-At-Arms. In effect, he was the ship's policeman and was answerable to the First Lieutenant and was responsible for the day-to-day enforcement of discipline on the ship. He was assisted by two Corporals (not related to the military rank of the same name) who themselves had the status of Petty Officers. He would investigate misbehaving seamen and would report them to the First Lieutenant who would in turn report them to the Captain who would decide their punishment. In cases where the Captain decided that the offender should be flogged, the flogging itself would be carried out by the Boatswains Mates. In cases where the alleged offence required a Court Martial, the offender would be kept in irons until a Court Martial could be arranged and the Master-at-Arms would then be responsible for their safety and security.
A 74-gun ship of the line would have 16 Midshipmen, appointed by the Port Admiral or local commander-in-chief on behalf of the Admiralty. Commanders in training, their job was to assist the Lieutenants in their day-to-day duties.
In addition to the Midshipmen, there would be Midshipmen-in-Ordinary. Also known as Quarterdeck Boys, these young men were in effect officers in training. They would usually be the sons of friends of the Captain, or had a family connection to the Captain, or be sons of people the Captain was either doing a favour for or owed a favour to. They would be on the ships books as Captains Servants, rated and paid as Able Seamen but wore the uniform and performed the duties of a Midshipman. A ship with a crew of almost 600 would entitle the Captain to have as many as 24 servants or four per hundred of her Company, but unless he was extraordinarily extravagant, the Captain would only actually require a fraction of this number, so the remaining posts were taken up with the Midshipmen-in-Ordinary. The Quarterdeck Boys would have to put in two years of sea-service before they could be appointed as Midshipmen proper and would have to serve at least six years in the post of Midshipman before they would be considered for their Lieutenants Examination.
In any case, the Captain would come aboard with his own staff who would move between appointments with him, consisting of his own Clerk or secretary, his Steward, who would have a Stewards Mate to assist him and his Coxswain. The Captains Coxswain was a Petty Officer who was expected to act as the Captain's eyes and ears on the Lower Deck. The Coxswain himself would appoint a Coxswain's Mate from amongst the Able Seamen.
The rest of the ships crew would be made up with Petty Officers, those men with experience in those roles, such as Captains and Yeomen of Parts of the ship such as the Forecastle, the Waist, Tops, Gun Captains etc. Able Seamen; those men with plenty of sea-going experience who could perform any task asked of them without supervision, Ordinary Seamen; those men with some sea-going experience and Landsmen, those with none. Landsmen were the unskilled labourers in a ship and were generally regarded by everyone else as being the lowest form of life until they had proved themselves. Boys were graded in much the same way, 1st class - those with Able Seaman levels of skills and experience, 2nd class, those with Ordinary Seaman level skills and 3rd class. The Boys 3rd Class were employed as cabin servants for the wardroom and for those senior Warrant Officers entitled to have servants, such as the Standing Officers. In action, the ship's boys would be employed in carrying gunpowder cartridges from the magazine to the Gun Captains, a role known as a "Powder Monkey".
HMS Cumberland's contingent of Marines would come aboard as a pre-existing unit and would consist of a Captain of Marines in charge, assisted by three Marine Lieutenants ranked in order of seniority, three Sergeants, three Corporals, two Drummers and 98 Marine Privates. The commissioned Marine officers were entitled to live in the wardroom with the commissioned sea-officers. The Marines themselves would live in a screened-off part of the Lower Deck, known as the Marine Barracks, while the non-commissioned officers would have the same status aboard the ship as the Petty Officers.
On completion, HMS Cumberland was a ship of 1,618 tons. She was 168ft 6in in length along the upper gundeck and 138ft 3in along the keel. The ship was 46ft 10in wide across her beams, drew 12ft 2in of water at her bows and 16ft 11.5in at her rudder. HMS Cumberland was armed in common with other ships of her type, that is 28 x 32pdr long guns on her lower gundeck, 28 x 18pdr long guns on her upper gundeck, 4 x 9pdr long guns on her forecastle with fourteen more on her quarterdeck. In addition to her main guns, HMS Cumberland carried a dozen half-pounder anti-personnel swivel guns fitted on her forecastle and quarterdeck handrails, bulwarks and in her fighting tops.
Elizabeth Class PlansOrlop and Lower Gundeck Plans:
Upper Gundeck, Quarterdeck and Forecastle Plans:
Inboard Profile and Plan:
Sheer Plan and Lines:
A model of HMS Cumberland, Port Quarter view:
Starboard Broadside view:
At the time of the beginning of the American War of Independence in 1775, the Tory Party formed the Government and Lord Sandwich, an avowed Tory, was First Lord of the Admiralty. There were also a great number of supporters of both parties serving in senior positions in the Royal Navy and all used their political allegiances to undermine their political rivals where they could. In addition to this, the opposition Whig Party was bitterly opposed to the war in America in the first place. They generally agreed with the American protests of 'No taxation without representation' and in support of that political position, Admiral Sir Augustus Keppel, as well as being one of the Royal Navy's most senior officers, was an MP for the Whig party and had refused to take any appointment which would pit him against the American rebels. With tensions against the old enemy across the English Channel building, Keppel had been pursuaded by King George III himself to take up the appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Channel Fleet, Lord Sandwich saw to it that Vice-Admiral Sir Hugh Palliser, also an MP and an equally fervent Tory as well as being a former member of the Board of Admiralty, was appointed as one of his divisional commanders, in charge of the Channel Fleet's Rear Division. Little wonder then, that Keppel felt isolated and vulnerable and that his appointment as Commander-in-Chief had the makings of a political stitch-up. Indeed, Keppel had only agreed to take the job as Commander-in-Chief Channel Fleet on receiving assurances from the King himself that he would be protected from the vicious political infighting over the war. The King saw Keppel as the most gifted, experienced, distinguished and senior Admiral the Royal Navy had. This and the fact that war against the old enemy across the Channel was brewing, whatever their positions, the political opponents now running the Royal Navy and the Channel Fleet were prepared to put their rivalries to one side, for now at least. On the 24th June 1778, Keppel joined the Channel Fleet at Portsmouth and hoisted his command flag in the 98-gun, Second Rate ship of the line HMS Prince George. Prior to his arrival at Portsmouth, Keppel had been assured by Lord Sandwich that 20 ships of the line would be ready. To his horror, on arriving, he found there were only six. The situation was compounded by the fact that Keppel had been ordered to detach eleven ships of the line from the Channel Fleet under Rear-Admiral Sir Hyde Parker in order that they could join a fleet to be commanded by Vice-Admiral the Honourable John Byron, which he in turn was to take to the Caribbean to reinforce the British naval presence there. Such was the shortage of men that Keppel was forced to order that jails in the Portsmouth area be raided to find men to man the fleet. On 9th May, Parker's force left Portsmouth and shortly after that, more time was wasted by another Royal Review of the fleet. All the while all this precious time was being wasted, Keppel was acutely aware that the enemy was building up the strength of the Brest Fleet. At the end of May 1778, the 100 gun First Rate Ship of the Line HMS Victory completed fitting for sea after having been in the Chatham Ordinary since being floated out thirteen years before and Admiral Keppel transferred his command flag to her. HMS Cumberland had been assigned to the Vanguard Division, commanded by Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Harland, flying his command flag in the Second Rate ship of the line HMS Queen.
On 12th June 1778, Admiral Keppel and his Channel Fleet was finally able to put to sea with twenty ships of the line and three frigates. Once the fleet was at sea, it didn't take long for individual ships to see action and the captures they made enabled Keppel to gain vital intelligence about the enemy's strength. He was outraged to find that, once again, he had been misinformed by his political enemies at the top of the Admiralty. He had been informed that the French Atlantic Fleet had no more than seventeen ships of the line available, where in fact the true figure was over thirty. Keppel decided after much soul-searching and conferring with his divisional commanders, Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Harland commanding the Vanguard Division, Campbell commanding the Centre Division and Palliser commanding the Rear, that they should return to Portsmouth for reinforcements. On arrival at Portsmouth on 25th June, a furious political row broke out, with Keppel coming under a vicious and sustained attack from the Government, who accused him of trying to undermine the Government by not trying hard enough and comparisons were made in Parliament with the fate of Admiral John Byng, who had been tried and executed for not doing his utmost against the French during the Battle of Minorca back in 1756. On 9th July, the Channel Fleet put to sea again after having collected the ten more ships of the line which had become available while they had been at sea. The Channel Fleet now comprised:
HMS Victory (Fleet Flagship and flagship of the Centre Division, 100 guns), HMS Prince George, HMS Queen (Flagship of the Vanguard Division), HMS Formidable (Flagship of the Rear Division), all of 98 guns, HMS Ocean, HMS Sandwich, HMS Duke (all of 90 guns), HMS Foudroyant (80), HMS Monarch, HMS Hector, HMS Centaur, HMS Shrewsbury, HMS Cumberland, HMS Berwick, the ex-French HMS Courageux, HMS Thunderer, HMS Valiant, HMS Terrible, HMS Vengeance, HMS Elizabeth, HMS Robust, HMS Ramillies and HMS Egmont (all of 74 guns), HMS Exeter, HMS Stirling Castle, HMS Vigilant, HMS America, HMS Bienfaisant, HMS Worcester and HMS Defiance (all of 64 guns). In addition to the ships of the line, there were the frigates HMS Arethusa (12pdr 32), HMS Proserpine, HMS Milford, HMS Fox and HMS Andromeda (all 9pdr frigates with 28 guns), the post-ship HMS Lively of 20 guns, the bomb vessels HMS Pluto and HMS Vulcan and the armed cutter HMS Alert of 12 guns.
In the afternoon of 23rd July 1778, HMS Cumberland was at sea with the fleet as part of Admiral Keppel's strategy to try to force an early confrontation with the French Atlantic Fleet, under the command of Vice-Admiral Le Compte Louis Guillomet D'Orvilliers when the French fleet was sighted. Now, it was the turn of the French to get a nasty surprise. The Compte D'Orvilliers had been led to believe that Keppel's fleet would only have 20 ships of the line instead of the 30 he now saw ranged against him. D'Orvillier's mission was to conduct commerce raiding operations in the Atlantic Ocean and Western Approches and to try, if possible, to avoid a confrontation with Keppel's fleet. On receiving the news that the enemy was in sight, Keppel ordered a general chase, which continued until about 19:00, when the French suddenly altered course towards the British. Keppel, who preferred to avoid a night action, ordered that the Channel Fleet alter course to bring them on a parallel heading to that of the French. Overnight, D'Orvilliers manoeuvred his fleet to gain the weather gage, that is, to put himself upwind of the British, giving himself a tactical advantage. Keppel was not too bothered about this as although it enabled the French to use the prevailing wind to their advantage, it also put his fleet between the enemy and their home port at Brest. Two French ships, the Duc de Bourgogne (80) and the Alexandre (64) became detached from the enemy fleet, set course back to Brest and evaded the ships sent by Keppel to chase them down. Things continued in this way for the next three days, with the French constantly frustrating Keppel's attempts to bring them to action.
In the early morning of 27th July, the wind changed and allowed Keppel's fleet including HMS Cumberland to close the range. At 05:30, Rear-Admiral Campbell took it upon himself to directly signal seven of the nine ships in Palliser's Rear Division to make more sail towards the French. Palliser was furious. Not only was he Campbell's superior officer, but he felt Campbell had subverted his command. He felt that, firstly the order should have come from Keppel himself and secondly, that it should have been passed through him, rather than directly to ships under his command. This was an unfortunate portent of things to come. At 09:30, the French changed tack and headed towards the British, who were sailing in line abreast, that is, with the ships sailing alongside each other rather than following each other in a line. Keppel, fed up with the French avoiding action, had decided to force the issue now that the weather was in his favour.
At 10:15, Keppel ordered another change of course, this time, bringing his fleet into line ahead so they could close the range and sail along the enemy's line in the opposite direction. The Rear Division had still not recovered from the confusion which followed Campbell's signal. At 11:20, the French opened fire. The next two hours saw fierce fighting in which ships of both sides were badly damaged. Confusion reigned in the Rear Division. HMS Elizabeth had been forced to take evasive action to avoid a collision with the stern of the flagship, HMS Formidable, which had come to a stop in order to continue her action against the rear-most two French ships of the line and HMS Ocean had difficulty aiming her shot between HMS Formidable and HMS Egmont, so close together were the two British ships. In the meantime, at 13:30, the Vanguard Division had completed it's first pass of the French line and had come about in order to begin another pass. At the same time, the Centre Division was getting clear of the French line, but HMS Victory had been so badly damaged in her masts and rigging that the manoevre to come about took almost an hour. At the same time, the French commander had ordered a change of course in order to allow his ships to engage a small group of about five British ships of the line which had been disabled. Keppel realised what was going on at 14:30 and ordered his ships to form a diagonal line, blocking the French ships from engaging. The French Admiral realised what was going on and backed off.
At 16:00, the British Centre and Vanguard Divisions had regained their formation and were sailing parallel to the French, whose Vanguard Division was abreast of the British centre. Keppel saw his chance, if he could alter course, he could cut off the French vanguard, surround the French fleet and destroy it wholesale. For this to be successful, Keppel needed Palliser's Rear Division to join the line in their proper position. He signalled Palliser to take up his station, but by 17:00, he had not received any reply, so sent HMS Fox to investigate and find out what was going on. By 19:00, the Rear Division had still not taken up it's proper position, so Keppel resorted to signalling individual ships, giving them the order to regain their stations. By the time they finally did this, it was too dark to recommence the battle, so instead, Keppel ordered that the fleet keep station on three sets of stern lights on the horizon, assuming them to be enemy ships.
Dawn the next day saw the realisation that the three ships they had followed through the night had been decoys. The rest of D'Orvilliers' French Atlantic Fleet had slipped past the British in the night and had escaped back to Brest. Keppel ordered that HMS Prince George, HMS Duke, HMS Elizabeth and HMS Bienfaisant chase them down, but neither HMS Prince George or HMS Elizabeth were in any condition to give chase due to battle damage while the three French vessels were relatively undamaged and easily escaped from the pursuing British ships.
With the First Battle of Ushant proving to be indecisive, Keppel abandoned plans to cruise with the fleet off the French coast due to his ship's damage aloft, so took the fleet back to Plymouth where they quickly made repairs and they were back off Ushant by the 23rd August. The Channel Fleet was unable to bring the French to action and arrived back at Spithead on 26th October.
The tracks of the fleets at the First Battle of Ushant:
A view of the First Battle of Ushant by Theodore Gudin:
While they had been at sea, all hell had broken loose in the UK. On 15th October, an article had been printed in the Whig-supporting General Advertiser and Morning Intelligencer, written anonymously, accusing Palliser of cowardice and politically inspired sabotage. Palliser found out about the article when the fleet returned to Spithead and demanded a meeting with Keppel to thrash things out. The two met in London in early November and Palliser demanded that Keppel sign a letter praising his behaviour during the Battle. Palliser's reason for not joining the rest of the fleet was that he assumed Keppel intended to resume the action the next day and not straight away. Keppel, still furious that a golden opportunity to bring about the decisive action he wanted had been missed, refused to sign the document. Palliser went on to publish his own version of events in the Tory-supporting press, which suggested that the result of the battle was because of Keppel's incompetence. Keppel was astonished and publicly declared that he would never serve with Palliser again. Very soon, the Whig press were publishing stories suggesting that the indecisive outcome of the First Battle of Ushant was fortunate because Palliser and Lord Sandwich had actually conspired to deliberately lose the battle in order to discredit Keppel personally and the Whig party in general. Keppel in the meantime, did his best to keep out of the row. He followed the official Admiralty line, which was that other than his absolute refusal to serve with Palliser again, he was content with the conduct and outcome of the battle. Later in November, there was a series of furious debates over the matter in Parliament, which both Palliser and Keppel had to attend in line with their duties as MPs. Again, Keppel stuck to the Admiralty line, until Palliser stated in the House that because Keppel had not been more fullsome in his praise, he felt that his honour, character and reputation had been brought into question and that in any case, he had not failed to follow Keppel's orders on the day. That was enough for Keppel, he had had enough of pretending. He stood in the House of Commons and admitted that in truth, he was far from happy with Palliser's conduct during the battle and that its indecisive result was because Palliser had failed to follow his orders to rejoin the fleet despite the fact that the signal ordering him to do so had been flying from the head of HMS Victory's main mast for a full five hours. Vice-Admiral Sir Hugh Palliser was ruined. His reputation in tatters, he desperately sought a way to redeem himself
Things came to a head on the 9th December, when Palliser formally accused Keppel of Neglect of Duty and Failure to do his Utmost in the Battle against the French. A reluctant Lord Sandwich ordered Keppel to face a Court Martial, knowing that if convicted, Keppel would face the death penalty like Admiral John Byng before him.
The Court Martial began aboard the 100 gun first rate ship of the line HMS Britannia in Portsmouth Harbour on 7th January 1779 and was a farce from beginning to end. Palliser, with powerful political friends on his side, led the prosecution himself and maintained that Keppel was to be held accountable for "not marshalling his fleet, going to fight in an un-officer like manner, making scandalous haste in quitting, making sail away from the enemy, giving them an opportunity to rally and presenting the appearance of flight disgraceful to the British flag". The trial became a public sensation and caused uproar, not just amongst the general public, but more worryingly during a time of war, amongst the most senior admirals in the Royal Navy. Things went from bad to worse when it became clear that evidence had been tampered with in that log book pages which supported Keppel's version of events were mysteriously missing, or had been conveniently corrected and re-written later. Keppel put up a fierce defence, which basically exposed the fact that the whole trial was nothing more than a politically motivated witch hunt and the Admiral was unanimously and honourably acquitted on 11th February. The Court Martial Board declared that the charges had from the beginning been malicious and unfounded. The only criticism they directed at Admiral Keppel was that he should have directed signals to individual ships under Pallisers command earlier than he did if he wanted to force a second engagement against the French that day. Keppel was carried through the streets of Portsmouth and held a party at his home with over sixty captains invited. The people turned against the Government and their supporters. Palliser's London home was ransacked by a mob who burned his furniture on a bonfire in St. James' Square. His sister's home in York was also demolished by a mob. Vice-Admiral Sir Hugh Palliser's positions, both in the Royal Navy and as an MP became untenable and he was forced to resign from both. On 12th February, the House of Commons voted their thanks to Keppel, followed on the 16th by the House of Lords. On the 18th, Admiral Keppel was given the Freedom of the City of London.
With Keppel's acquittal and the subsequent uproar, Whig politicians smelled blood and their leader, Charles Fox forced a vote in Parliament to censure the Admiralty for their treatment of the hero of the Battle of Ushant. During the debate, Fox alleged that the Tory Lord Sandwich had deliberately failed to inform Keppel of the true strength of the French Brest Fleet, or at least had been incompetent in failing to ascertain their true numbers. The Tory Government led by Lord North scraped together enough support to vote down Fox's Motion by a narrow margin. In the meantime, Admiral Keppel, in poor health and tired of being used as a political pawn, wrote to the King asking to be released from command of the Channel Fleet. The reason he gave was that he was no longer prepared to serve under men he did not trust. The King was less than impressed and passed the letter to the Admiralty and after heated correspondence, Keppel resigned from his command on the 18th of March. Palliser had in the meantime requested a Court Martial of his own in order to try to clear his name. The Court Martial, held aboard HMS Sandwich at Portsmouth turned into a Board of Inquiry as no charges were ever laid. Lord Sandwich, embarrassed enough already, tried to fill the Court Martial Board with sympathetic Tory supporters, but was not entirely successful. Although Palliser was cleared of any wrongdoing and the Court Martial Board had been seen by a suspicious public as being biased, his acquittal was not a unanimous verdict and this alone pursuaded the Admiralty not to restore Palliser to his command. He was instead offered the highly paid post of Governor of the Naval Hospital at Greenwich. Captain Peyton was one of those officers who sat on the Court Martial Board for Palliser's trial.
After Keppel's resignation, Lord Sandwich faced a further problem, which was a result of Keppel's treatment in the aftermath of the Battle of Ushant. There was a shortage of Tory-supporting officers with the seniority and experience to take command of the Channel Fleet and none of the Whig-supporting Admirals with the necessary experience and seniority were interested in the job in the light of Keppel's experience at the hands of the Government.
In the meantime, on 12th April 1779, the French and Spanish concluded a treaty which would bring Spain into the war. The Spanish were not particularly interested in operations against the British in and around America; they feared for the security of their own possessions should the British eventually win the war. They were more interested in operations against British interests closer to home, particularly in regaining Gibraltar. On 3rd June 1779, the French Brest fleet left it's base and sailed south and on 16th, the Spanish declared war on Britain. On 19th March 1779, Admiral Sir Charles Hardy had been dragged out his semi-retirement as Governor of the Greenwich Hospital, replaced by Palliser, and had taken command of the Channel Fleet, flying his command flag in HMS Victory. What Hardy and the British didn't know was the the French and Spanish were working to a plan. The French fleet of 30 ships of the line was to rendezvous with a similarly sized Spanish fleet off Corunna and the combined fleet would then sail up the English Channel overwhelming Hardy's Channel Fleet, pick up some 40,000 French troops and over 400 invasion craft then assembling in the area around St Malo and Le Havre. This force would then capture the Isle of Wight and use that as the springboard from which to mount an invasion of Britain, landing in and around the Portsmouth area. The plan had a good chance of success. Both the French commander, the Compte D'Orvilliers and the Spanish, Don Louis de Cordova, were experienced combat commanders. Their combined fleets outnumbered the British Channel Fleet three to two and the British commander had not commanded a force of ships at sea since the Seven Years War.
Things began to go wrong for the Combined Fleet almost straight away. The French had not fully provisioned their ships for fear of the British figuring out what was going on and were relying on being resupplied by the Spanish when the two fleets met. On arrival at the rendezvous point, the Sisarga Islands off Corunna, the Spanish were not there. Not only did they not arrive the following day, or the following week, but they didn't get there until the 22nd July, almost two months after the French had left Brest. In the hot sun aboard crowded ships, it was only a matter of time before disease broke out and so it did. With insufficient supplies, the French sailors were suffering with malnutrition and scurvy and typhus and smallpox were rampaging through the fleet. On 25th July, the Combined Fleet left for the Channel but were delayed by adverse winds and didn't pass the island of Ushant at the mouth of the English Channel until 12th August. On 14th August, the combined fleet came within sight of the English coast and their arrival caused a wave of panic to spread throughout the country. The British Government moved quickly as the sight of over 60 enemy ships of the line within touching distance of England itself could only mean one thing - invasion. General Jeffrey, 1st Baron Amherst was appointed to take command of the defences and threw himself into the task. The Sevenoaks-born military genius quickly ordered the throwing-up of earthworks all over the south coast, including the first fortifications on the Western Heights at Dover.
A further problem occurred for the Combined Fleet when they failed to sight the British Channel Fleet. What they didn't know was then when Admiral Hardy learned that the French fleet had left Brest, he ordered that the Channel Fleet including HMS Cumberland patrol around the Isles of Scilly, nowhere near the Combined Fleet. On 16th August, the Compte D'Orvilliers received orders from Paris to conduct the landings around the Falmouth area. D'Orvilliers strongly disagreed and sent a letter to the Government asking them to urgently reconsider. The Combined Fleet waited for the reply from Paris off Plymouth until 18th August when they were driven out into the Atlantic by a severe easterly gale. On 25th August as they struggled against the wind to regain their earlier position off Plymouth, D'Orvilliers learned the location of the Channel Fleet and headed for the Isles of Scilly in order to bring Admiral Hardy and his fleet to action. This had to be done quickly as their losses to disease and malnutrition were increasing by the day and it wouldn't be long before they would be forced to abandon ships due to a lack of men. Sir Charles Hardy had learned of the existence of the Combined Fleet and figured out that having been driven far to the west, that they would be looking to regain their former position and that they would be looking for him and his fleet. He also know that outnumbered the way he was, he wouldn't have much of a chance should the enemy succeed in bringing him to action. He decided to head east, hoping that the enemy would follow him under the guns of the numerous shore batteries now guarding the approaches to Portsmouth Harbour. HMS Cumberland with the rest of the ships passed Lands End on 31st August and on 3rd September anchored in the Solent and began to prepare for the titanic struggle which appeared to be imminent. The enemy however, had different ideas. Their losses to disease and malnutrition had reached the point where not only would they not be able to fight their ships effectively against a well trained and determined British fleet, but that the troops, should they land, would be fighting through the bitterly cold British autumn and winter. They decided to call off the invasion and on the day that HMS Cumberland and the other ships dropped anchor in the heavily defended waters of the Solent, the Combined Fleet turned around and went home.
In the treaty he had signed with the Americans, the King of France formally gave up any claims to territory held by the British in North America, but territories in the West Indies were fair game as far as he was concerned. In September of 1778, the French captured the British-held island of Dominica, which as far as the British were concerned, served as an illustration of how underprepared they were for the outbreak of war with France. On the 26th December 1778, Captain Payton received orders to take his ship to the West Indies as reinforcement for the fleet there.
By December of 1779, HMS Cumberland had returned to the Channel Fleet. Since the beginning of the war, the Spanish Government had also been supplying the Americans with arms and military support and they had signed a Treaty with the French promising to give all assistance needed in the fight against the British, the Treaty of Aranjuez, concluded on April 12 1779. Spain's main motivation for entering the war was to regain Gibraltar, ceded to the British in perpetuity under the Treaty of Utrecht in 1714. As soon as hostilities commenced, the Spanish had laid seige to Gibraltar and thrown everything they had into their attempt to take the Rock from the British. French and Spanish fleets blockaded Gibraltar while ashore, an enormous Spanish army constructed forts, redoubts and batteries from which to attack. The Spanish had expected that with the British bogged down in North America, taking Gibraltar would be straightforward. They had underestimated the British determination to hang onto it. As the winter of 1779 began to bite, the 5,300 strong garrison began to suffer the effects of being under seige and food began to be severely rationed.
Vice-Admiral Sir George Rodney had been ordered to raise his flag in the 90-gun Second Rate ship of the line HMS Sandwich, take up the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Leeward Islands Station and take a squadron of four ships of the line to the West Indies to reinforce the fleet already there. Before he proceeded to the Caribbean, Rodney had been ordered to take a fleet, break the Franco-Spanish blockade of Gibraltar and deliver much needed supplies and reinforcements. HMS Cumberland was one of a number of ships placed under Rodney's command for the operation. When Rodney's fleet finally put to sea after being delayed by the weather, on the 29th December 1779, the fleet consisted of the following ships:
The First Rate ship of the line HMS Royal George of 100 guns, the Second Rate ships of the line HMS Sandwich (90, fleet flagship), HMS Prince George (98), the Third Rate ships of the line HMS Alcide, HMS Ajax, HMS Bedford, HMS Cullodden, HMS Cumberland, HMS Edgar, HMS Montagu, HMS Monarch, HMS Shrewsbury, HMS Terrible, HMS Resolution, HMS Invincible, HMS Defence, HMS Marlborough and HMS Dublin (all of 74 guns), HMS America and HMS Bienfaisant (both of 64 guns), with the Frigates HMS Convert and HMS Pearl (both 12pdr armed ships with 32 guns) with the Post-Ships HMS Triton, HMS Pegasus, HMS Porcupine and HMS Hyaena (all 9pdr-armed ships of 24 guns).
Also amongst the fleet were the 74-gun ship HMS Hector, the 44-gun two-decker HMS Phoenix, and the 9pdr-armed 28-gun frigates HMS Andromeda and HMS Greyhound. These ships formed the escort for the outward bound West Indies convoy which departed Spithead at the same time as the fleet for the relief of Gibraltar. These ships, together with the West Indies convoy parted company with Rodney's fleet on the 4th January 1780.
The following day, the fleets lookouts spotted over 20 sail, heading in the direction of Cadiz. Quickly identifying them to be Spanish, Rodney ordered the fleet to close the range. The strangers were identified as being 15 merchant vessels and seven warships belonging to the Spanish Royal Caracas Company. The whole convoy bar one vessel was captured in what is now known as the Attack on the Caracas Convoy. Rodney quickly ordered that any vessels carrying cargoes useful to Gibraltar should stay with the fleet and the rest of the ships were sent with prize crews to the UK accompanied by HMS America and HMS Pearl.
The largest of the escorting Company warships, the 64-gun ship Guipuzcoano was taken into the Royal Navy and renamed HMS Prince William in honour of the thirteen-year-old Prince William Henry, Duke of Clarence, third son of King George III and future King William IV, who was serving in the fleet as a Midshipman in Ordinary aboard HMS Prince George.
By now, the Spanish were aware of Rodney's fleet and their mission and a fleet of 11 Spanish ships of the line under Admiral Juan de Langara was sent to intercept Rodney's force. In addition, the Spanish Cadiz fleet under Admiral Luis de Cordova was also sent to intercept. Cordova, when he learned of the size and strength of the British fleet, returned to Cadiz. At 13:00 on 16th January 1780, the British and Spanish fleets spotted each other off Cape St Vincent. Rodney, who at the time was suffering with severe gout and arthritis, had retired sick to his cabin aboard HMS Sandwich and when the Spanish fleet was sighted, his Flag Captain, Walter Young, urged him to give orders to engage the enemy. Rodney instead merely gave orders for his fleet to form a line abreast. The Spanish formed a line of battle, but when he saw the size of Rodney's force, Langara ordered that his fleet make all sail and head for Cadiz. Captain Young kept Rodney updated with events as they happened and at 14:00, Rodney was confident that the force they had sighted was not the vanguard for a larger force and ordered a general chase and for his ships to engage the Spanish as they came up on them. Because of the squally conditions, Rodney ordered that his ships allow the Spaniards to have the wind-gage, that is to sail downwind of them. This went against normal British practice which was to sail upwind of their opponents but in the weather conditions, Rodney felt that the Spaniards were unlikely to be able to open their lower gundeck gunports, giving the British the advantage in weight of fire. It also put Rodney's ships between the Spaniards and the safety of Cadiz. Rodney's ships also benefitted from the fact that the Royal Navy had recently begun to copper their ship's bottoms, which kept them clean and gave them the advantage of superior speed. The British quickly outpaced the Spanish and within a couple of hours of the chase beginning, the rear-most Spanish ship, the 74 gun Santo Domingo was engaged first by HMS Edgar, then by HMS Marlborough and then HMS Ajax, before blowing up with the loss of all but one of her crew. The chase continued and at 18:00, it began to get dark. At 19:30, HMS Defence (74) engaged the Spanish flagship, the 80 gun two-decker Fenix and the two ships became engaged in a firefight which went on for over an hour before Langara's flagship surrendered. During the fight, the Fenix was engaged in passing by HMS Prince George and HMS Montagu. HMS Bedford became engaged with the Spanish ship Princesa of 70 guns at about 04:30. The fight went on for an hour or so until the Princessa was forced to surrender. By dawn, it was all over. Of Langara's 11 ships of the line, his flagship Fenix (80), the 74 gun ships Diligente, Monarca, and San Egenio had been taken, along with the Princesa and the 64 gun ship San Julian. The Santo Domingo (74) had been utterly destroyed when she blew up and the San Agustin, San Lorenzo, San Jenaro and San Justo (all of 74 guns) and the frigates Santa Cecilia and Santa Rosalia (both of 34 guns), managed to escape into Cadiz.
The First Battle of Cape St Vincent was unusual in that it was mostly fought at night and is for that reason, alternatively known as the Moonlight Battle. Because she was not heavily engaged in the battle, HMS Cumberland's casualties were limited to a single man wounded.
The First Battle of Cape St Vincent by Francis Holman. The Santo Domingo can be seen blowing up in the background and the three-decked ship in the foreground is Rodney's flagship, the 90 gun HMS Sandwich:
The Aftermath of the Battle by Dominic Serres. In this painting, the British fleet have surrounded their Spanish prizes and are in the process of putting prize crews aboard:
Rodney's fleet arrived in Gibraltar on 19th January after having driven off the blockading enemy. Rodney himself did not arrive until a couple of days later, having stopped off at Tangiers to drop off the Prisoners of War, including the wounded Spanish Admiral Langara. After breaking the Spanish blockade of Minorca, also under seige by the Spanish and dropping off supplies for the garrison there, Rodney took his squadron to the West Indies and HMS Cumberland returned to the UK.
By early 1781, Vice-Admiral Sir George Darby was Commander-in-Chief of the Channel Fleet. Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Hardy had died in-post in May of 1780. He had been replaced by Vice-Admiral Sir Francis Geary who had resigned his command due to ill-health three months after his appointment. Darby was a Tory supporter and was the most senior Tory-supporting naval officer at the time. The First Lord of the Admiralty John Montagu, the 4th Earl of Sandwich was a prominent member of the Government and after almost coming unstuck in the Court Martial of the Whig-supporting Admiral Keppel and it's aftermath, wanted to ensure that there were no political rivals in senior positions in the Royal Navy. In any case, after the way Admiral Keppel had been treated by the Government of Lord North in the aftermath of the Battle of Ushant, none of the Whig-supporting senior officers in the Royal Navy were interested in the job.
By the spring of 1781, Gibraltar was in dire need of relief again and Vice-Admiral Darby had been ordered to repeat Rodney's feat in taking the bulk of the Channel Fleet to breach the Franco-Spanish blockade of the Rock again. On the 13th March 1781, Vice-Admiral Darby left the fleet anchorage off St Helens, Isle of Wight with the following ships of the line:
HMS Royal George and HMS Britannia (both First Rate ships of 100 guns), HMS Prince George and HMS Formidable (both Second Rate ships of 98 guns), HMS Namur, HMS Duke, HMS Queen, HMS Union and HMS Ocean (all Second Rate ships of 90 guns), HMS Foudroyant (Third Rate two-decker of 80 guns), HMS Fortitude, HMS Defence, HMS Canada, HMS Marlborough, HMS Alexander, HMS Bellona, HMS Cumberland, HMS Edgar, HMS Valiant, HMS Courageux and HMS Dublin (all Third Rate ships of 74 guns), HMS Nonsuch, HMS Lion, HMS St.Albans, HMS Repulse, HMS Bienfaisant and HMS Inflexible (all Third Rate ships of 64 guns) and HMS Medway (Fourth Rate ship of 60 guns).
With the fleet were the following Frigates, Sloops of War and other vessels:
HMS Minerva and HMS Flora (both 18pdr-armed Fifth Rate Frigates of 38 guns), the ex-French HMS Prudente (Fifth Rate Frigate, 12pdr-armed, 38 guns), the ex-French HMS Monsieur (Fifth Rate, 12pdr-armed, 36 guns), HMS Emerald, HMS Ambuscade (both Fifth Rate, 12pdr-armed Frigates of 32 guns), HMS Vestal, HMS Crescent (both Sixth Rate 9pdr-armed Frigates of 28 guns), HMS Harpy (6pdr-armed ship-sloop, 18 guns), HMS Firebrand (6pdr-armed, ship-sloop, 16 guns), HMS Lightning (6pdr-armed ship-sloop, 14 guns), HMS Furnace (fireship, 4pdr-armed, 8 guns), HMS Kite (cutter, 4pdr-armed, 10 guns) and HMS Pheasant (cutter, 3pdr-armed, 10 guns).
The fleet passed Cork and picked up more cargo ships bound for Gibraltar. The Spanish fleet at Cadiz made no attempt to intercept the convoy and on the 11th April they sighted Cape Spartel, on the coast of modern-day Morocco. The following day at noon, the whole convoy and the escorting fleet anchored in the Bay of Gibraltar. That night, thirteen of the transport vessels escorted by HMS Flora and HMS Crescent left Gibraltar bound for Minorca. The beseiging enemy opened a tremendous bombardment of the ships, which was completely ineffective and did nothing to slow or prevent the British from unloading the ships. The only damage they did was to the mizzen mast of HMS Nonsuch.
On the 19th April, the fleet left Gibraltar and arrived back at Spithead on the 22nd May. The following is an extract of the letter from Vice-Admiral Darby to the Admiralty describing events:
"You will be pleased to acquaint my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that early on the Morning of the 11th Instant, we saw Three Sail at a Distance from each other; I sent the Alexander, Foudroyant, and Minerva, to chase. Captain
Fielding, who came up the nearest to them, said they were Three Frigates, which made into Cadiz, where he counted Thirty-three Sail of large Ships; Six of them had Flags and distinguishing Pendants, with a Number of small Ships and Craft of all
Kinds. That Evening we brought-to off Cape Spartel, when I dispatched the Kite Cutter with a Letter to General Elliot. The next Day about Noon, the Convoy, with Four Ships of the Line and some Frigates to protect them, anchored in and about Rosier Bay, in Gibraltar, I kept under Sail with the Rest of the Squadron. At Dusk the Flora and Crescent parted Company with Thirteen Sail for Minorca.
As soon as the Ships were secured, they began unloading the Victuallers. The Morning of the 14th, finding the Wind likely to continue Westerly, and being desirous of giving the Garrison all the Assistance in my Power during our Stay,
by facilitating the unloading the Victuallers, and protecting them from the Enemy's Gun-Boats, I directed Sir John Ross (who hoisted his Flag on Board the Alexander) to anchor, with the other Two-decked Ships of his Division, in the Road.
The 19th I anchored with some of the Ships to the Eastward of Europa Point, in order to set up the Rigging, and get off some fresh Water. The next Morning, the 20th, the Wind sprung up to the Eastward, which being willing to avail myself
of as soon as possible, Sir John Ross having unmoored the Ships in the Road, I at Nine made the Signal to weigh, notwithstanding which it was Five o'Clock in the Evening before I could make Sail, owing to the usual Delays on those Occasions.
Sir John Ross has been indefatigable in his Attention to all Points of this Duty and the Captains, both of the Line of Battle Ships and Frigates, have greatly exerted themselves in their Attacks upon the Gun-Boats. The Minerva and
Monsieur have had some Men badly wounded, and the Nonsuch's Misen-Mast so much hurt that it was shifted.
Yesterday Morning I made the Signal for the Foudroyant to stand towards Cadiz but the Wind would not permit her to fetch it, but Captain Jervis is certain nothing was off the Port. The Kite Cutter carries these Dispatches Captain Trollope will be able to inform their Lordships of such Things as have not come under my Notice, he having been constantly employed actively in the Bay Night and Day; for which Service I leave him to their Lordships Consideration"."Captain" Trollope was actually in the post of Lieutenant in Command in HMS Kite, but as the commander of a vessel, regardless of his actual rank, was entitled to be addressed as "Captain".
Vice-Admiral Sir George Darby, painted by George Romney in 1784 against a backgound of his relief of Gibraltar:
On the 28th March 1780, whilst en-route to Gibraltar, HMS Cumberland captured the French privateer brig Le Duc de Chartres of 22 guns. The vessel was taken into the Royal Navy as HMS Duc de Chartres and was sold into the merchant service after the war. The prize money for that capture was shared amongst the whole fleet, along with prize money for a number of other captures made, including the magnificent Spanish Frigate Leocadia, actually taken by HMS Canada (74).
In May of 1780, HMS Cumberland entered the Royal Dockyard at Plymouth for a brief refit which saw her lower hull coppered for the first time.
In the meantime, Vice-Admiral Darby was a busy man. After his successful relief of Gibraltar, Darby had received orders from the Admiralty to bring the fleet home as quickly as possible. The Admiralty had received intelligence that the French Brest Fleet was planning a number of large operations to carry out commerce raiding in the English Channel and Western Approaches and with the expected approach of large convoys from both the East and West Indies, for the French at least, these areas would be a target-rich environment. By the time HMS Cumberland rejoined the fleet in June of 1780, the fleet was being run ragged with the demands of protecting the trade convoys from an enemy squadron known to consist of seven ships of the line and four frigates under the command of the French admiral Toussaint Guillaume La Motte Picquet. On the 7th July 1780, the fleet anchored in Torbay. The strain on the ships and their crews was beginning to tell and when the Channel Fleet arrived in Torbay, only nine ships were still fit for action. The rest were in desperate need of refit and repair while HMS Defence (74), HMS Marlborough (74) and HMS Medway (60) were unable to put to sea at all because of outbreaks of Scurvy caused by a lack of supplies. Darby had been forced to send Frigates to meet the Jamaica convoy and re-route it around the north of Scotland to avoid the French. On the 9th July, the fleet arrived at Spithead, but there was to be no let-up for the exhausted Darby and his men and ships. Two days after arriving at Spithead, they were ordered to sea again. This time, it was to meet the French Brest Fleet of 18 ships of the line including four huge three-deckers under the Compte de Guichen. Although the Admiralty had received intelligence that the French were at sea in numbers, they had no idea why they were at sea. They did not know that the Compte de Guichen had been ordered to sea with instructions to meet the Spanish Cadiz Fleet and escort a large convoy of troopships bound for Minorca. On the 12th July, Darby received fresh orders - to escort an outbound convoy protected by three ships of the line under Rear-Admiral the Honourable Robert Digby to a point 150 leagues (or 450 miles) west of The Lizard, and then to hunt down De Guichen and his fleet. In the meantime, all other outward bound convoys were held back.
The Channel Fleet's departure from Spithead was delayed by unfavourable winds until the 19th July. The fleet followed the coast west, picking up reinforcements from Plymouth which included the newly refitted HMS Cumberland, so that by the time he headed out to sea, Vice-Admiral Darby had 21 ships of the line under his command. Not knowing where the French actually were, Darby and the fleet remained in the vicinity of Cape Finisterre for a couple of weeks. On the 17th August 1780, Darby received intelligence from a Portugese merchantman that a large Franco-Spanish fleet of 40 ships of the line with 50 or so other vessels was 200 miles to the north with nothing to stop them. Darby immediately ordered the fleet to head back into the English Channel with all the sail they could set and entered Torbay on the 24th August having seen neither hide nor hair of the enemy. Vice-Admiral Darby decided to ignore his orders and remain in Torbay with the Fleet's ships of the line and send his Frigates and Sloops of War out to meet incoming convoys and redirect them once more around Scotland. HMS Juno (12pdr, 32) received intelligence from a Venetian merchantman that the enemy was in the Atlantic and HMS Emerald (12pdr, 32) met with a Swedish merchantman who reported that the enemy had been seen to the west of the Isles of Scilly on the 29th August. On the 1st September, Darby received a letter from Vice-Admiral Lord Shuldham reporting that HMS Agamemnon (64) had actually seen the enemy a hundred miles west of The Lizard on the 30th August and had counted 47 ships of the line.
Finally, Lord Sandwich had received firm intelligence about what the enemy was up to and it tied all the sightings together. After meeting with De Guichen's force, the combined fleet of forty-nine ships of the line had escorted the troopships to Minorca and had mounted an invasion there, landing on the 20th August 1780 with the British garrison finally surrendering in February the following year. In the meantime, the enemy fleet had headed back out into the Atlantic, minus the troopships, with the intention of commerce-raiding, with particular interest in Cork, where the great West Indies and America convoys were waiting. Armed with this information and bearing in mind the experience of Vice-Admiral Hardy in 1779, Darby was ordered to sea again, this time not to attack the enemy but to shadow them and wait until the enemy, particularly the Spanish element of the combined fleet, had been weakend by malnutrition and disease and then pick off the stragglers. Darby was unable to leave Torbay until the 14th September, but when he did, he spent the time seaching for the enemy in the Western Approaches expecting to meet them at any time.
In fact, as predicted, sickness and poor morale affected the Spanish to such an extent that they parted company with the French on the 5th September. It was to be the 19th October before Vice-Admiral Darby learned for sure that the threat had receded and on the 5th November 1780, the fleet anchored in Spithead, exhausted but still ready for a fight. Vice-Admiral Sir George Darby might not have covered himself in glory in some decisive naval battle, but his calm leadership and level-headedness had held the fleet together through a crisis.
On the 11th September 1781, Captain Peyton was appointed as First Captain in the First Rate ship of the line HMS Britannia, flying Vice-Admiral Darby's command flag. In that role, he would have to all intents and purposes been Darby's Chief of Staff and would have had little involvement in the day-to-day running of HMS Britannia. That would have been the job of the Second Captain. Not all flag-officers organised their flagship's staff in this way, but Darby did. Captain Joseph Peyton was promoted to Rear-Admiral in 1787 and at the time of the Spanish Armaments Crisis in 1790, was Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean. Shortly after the outbreak of the French Revolutionary War in 1793, he was appointed Commander-in-Chief at the Downs and died a full Admiral in 1804.
Captain Peyton's replacement in HMS Cumberland was Captain Sir Richard Bickerton, the 1st Baronet Bickerton of Upton. Born in 1727, Bickerton had entered the Royal Navy as Midshipman in Ordinary at the age of ten in 1737. He had passed his Examination for Lieutenant on the 1st January 1745 and first held a command when he was appointed Master and Commander in the fireship HMS Aetna of 14 guns on the 2nd August 1758. He didn't have to wait long to be Posted; he was appointed Captain in the Post-Ship HMS Glasgow of 20 guns on the 21st August 1759. Captain Bickerton was an experienced combat commander having commanded the 70-gun Third Rate ship of the line HMS Devonshire during the Capture of Havana during the Seven Years War in 1762. He had also commanded the 74-gun ship HMS Terrible under Keppel in the Battle of Ushant at the beginning of the war and another Seventy-Four, HMS Fortitude, at the Battle of Dogger Bank earlier in 1781.
In the meantime, the fortunes of war swung back and forth until about a month into Captain Bickerton's term in command of HMS Cumberland. On October 19th 1781, General Lord Cornwallis was forced to surrender, along with the bulk of the British Army in North America at Yorktown after the Royal Navy had failed to breach a French blockade of Chesapeake Bay in the battle of the same name. This was a disaster for the British war effort in North America and effectively ended the war. The French turned their attentions to expelling the British from their rich possessions in the West Indies but for the Channel Fleet, the end of major combat operations in North America meant that they had ships to spare. The British were fighting the French in India and in support of this, a fleet under Admiral Sir Edward Hughes was engaged in operations against a French fleet under Admiral the Baillie de Suffren. They had already fought a series of inconclusive engagements against each other and in November of 1781, Captain Bickerton was appointed Commodore of a squadron of ships ordered to sail to India and reinforce Hughes' fleet. Commodore Bickerton raised his command Broad Pendant in the ex-Spanish 80-gun two decker HMS Gibraltar (formerly called Fenix, flagship of the Spanish force defeated at the Moonlight Battle of Cape St.Vincent) and was replaced in command of HMS Cumberland by Captain William Adam.
Captain William Adam had been born in 1728, but the date of his entry into the Royal Navy is not known. He is known to have held a Pursers Warrant, but was Commissioned as a Lieutenant on the 17th May 1756. He was appointed Master and Commander in the Fireship HMS Pluto (14) on 21st November 1761, a post he held until the 2nd December 1762. He was first Posted or promoted to Captain on the 20th June 1765 and was appointed to command the 12pdr-armed Frigate HMS Juno of 32 guns.
These days, a trip to India is a day on a plane away but in 1782, it was a major undertaking and would take three to four months, depending on the weather and would involve regular stops to replenish their stocks of fresh fruit, vegetables and water. Bickerton's force which included HMS Cumberland was delayed on departure by six weeks, the delay caused by the need to make repairs to one of the stores ships the sqadron was to escort to Bombay. The ship's owner was, apparently, a man with friends in high places in the Government and did not want his ship sailing to India unescorted. The squadron finally departed Spithead on the 6th February 1782 in company with the stores ships and the East Indies Convoy. They were off Madeira on the 7th March and were forced to alter course out into the Atlantic when Commodore Bickerton received intelligence that a force of French ships were at sea looking for him and his ships. By mid-April, were reported to be off Brazil and didn't arrive at Madras until the 19th October 1782, by which time the ships were riddled with scurvy as a result of being at sea for seven months. On arrival at Madras, Bickerton received news that Hughes' fleet had been driven out to sea by the weather and had left for Bombay. Bickerton's ships arrived there on the 28th November 1782, but it was to be the early part of 1783 before Sir Richard Bickerton and his squadron were able to rendezvous with Admiral Hughes and his fleet.
By June of 1783, the British were laying seige to Cuddalore and Suffren was ordered to support the city with his 15 ships of the line. Admiral Hughes' fleet which by now included HMS Cumberland was there when Suffren arrived on 13th June 1783. Hughes was not keen on facing the French again, so moved his force away. After five days of adverse winds, Suffren anchored his force off the city. After a conference with the commander of the defending force, it became apparent that the outcome of the seige was going to be dependant on a naval action. The two fleets then began manoeuvring for advantage from 18th June, but were both frustrated in their attempts by fickle winds. Finally, the winds settled down from a westerly direction and the two fleets engaged each other again on 20th June. The action was fought with long-range gunnery and neither fleet was able to significantly damage the other and both forces withdrew at nightfall.
The Battle of Cuddalore, by Auguste Jugelet:
On 22nd June, Hughes headed back to Madras. Many of his ships required repairs, his force was short of men to the tune of 1,120 across the fleet and were suffering with a lack of water and fresh fruit which had caused an outbreak of the dreaded scurvy aboard his ships. The Seige of Cuddalore continued until 29th June when a British Frigate, HMS Medea (9pdr, 28) under Captain Erasmus Gower and flying a flag of truce brought news of the war's end. In the Battle of Cuddalore, HMS Cumblerland suffered casualties of two men killed and eleven wounded.
The American War of Independence was ended by the 1783 Treaty of Paris, signed on September 3rd 1783 and effective from May 12th 1784. For the British, the colonies in North America had been lost, but their possessions in the Caribbean and India had not only been successfully defended, but the French had been pushed back further. Other than the Americans gaining their independence, France had achieved nothing and financially, the French were in a worse position than they were at the start. With the end of the war, HMS Cumberland left Bombay on the 3rd November 1783 and returned to Plymouth and Captain Adam paid his ship off into the Plymouth Ordinary on 1st June 1784 after a voyage which would have taken them across the Indian Ocean, the southern Pacific Ocean, around Cape Horn and diagonally across the Atlantic Ocean. They would have made a number of stops along the way to replenish their stores, but nevertheless, it was still an enormous undertaking.
The ship was stripped of her yards and spars, sails, running rigging and stores. The ship became the responsibility of the Master Attendant in the Dockyard and was manned by a skeleton crew comprised of her Standing Officers, their servants and 26 Able Seamen. After paying off HMS Cumberland, Captain Adam was laid off on half pay and never held another sea-going appointment. He was promoted through seniority to Rear-Admiral on the 1st February 1793, Vice-Admiral on the 4th July 1794 and Admiral on the 14th February 1799. He died in Lambeth on the 24th October 1804.
In December of 1785, HMS Cumberland was taken into the Royal Dockyard at Plymouth to begin a Middling Repair. This took until February of 1787 to complete because of the chronic shortage of shipwrights suffered by all the Royal Dockyards except Chatham caused by a mass layoff following the end of the war. Seven months later, HMS Cumberland was fitted to serve as Guardship at Plymouth. In this role, the ship was armed and rigged, but manned by only about half her normal crew complement. She was to provide security for the ships of the Plymouth Ordinary and to control the comings and goings of those Plymouth-based vessels still in commission. The ship commissioned under Captain John MacBride and remained as Guardship at Plymouth until the 14th September 1791 when she paid off back into the Plymouth Ordinary, to be manned by a skeleton crew as before.
In the wider world, 1787 and 1788 had seen the harvests in France fail, leading to a severe famine which had seen people starving to death in the streets of Paris. In July 1789, the people rose up in Revolution and a Constitutional Monarchy was established. Chaos and anarchy followed and after the King and Queen were caught trying to flee Paris to join Monarchist forces fighting on their behalf, the French Monarchy was abolished in December 1792 and the King and Queen were tried and executed for High Treason in January of 1793. Britain expelled the French ambassador in protest and on 1st February 1793, France declared war on Britain, starting the series of wars known collectively as the French Revolutionary War.
Shortly after war was declared, HMS Cumberland was taken once more into the Royal Dockyard at Plymouth and was fitted for sea. She recommissioned on the 20th February 1793 under Captain Thomas Louis as flagship of her former captain, now promoted to Rear-Admiral, John MacBride. The ship had been commissioned for the Channel Fleet, under the veteran Admiral Lord Howe who flew his command flag in the new First Rate ship of the line HMS Queen Charlotte (100).
Captain Louis was one of a generation of naval officers who had cut their teeth during the American War. Born in 1758, he had passed his Examination for Lieutenant on the 18th July 1777. On the 9th April 1781 he gained his first command appointment when he was appointed Master and Commander in the Hired Armed Vessel Mackworth of 18 guns. He was Posted on the 20th January 1783 and was appointed to command the 90-gun Second Rate ship of the line HMS Sandwich. This appointment was purely for the purposes of attaining the rank of Captain - HMS Sandwich was paid off the day after and the now Captain Louis was laid off on half-pay based on the rank of Captain rather than Lieutenant as he would have been had he not been Posted.
Once the declaration of war had been made, the French began to assemble their Atlantic Fleet in Quiberon Bay, so that by the end of August 1793, they had 21 ships of the line and 4 frigates. Of the ships of the line, one was a ship of 120 guns, two were of 110 guns each, three more were ships of 80 guns and the remaining 15 ships were of 74 guns each.
In addition to HMS Queen Charlotte and HMS Cumberland, Howe also had at his disposal a further two 100 gun First Rate ships (HMS Royal George and HMS Royal Sovereign), a 98 gun Second Rate ship (HMS London), nine Third Rate ships of 74 guns including HMS Cumberland each plus a further four Third Rate ships with 64 guns and nine Frigates. The time up to the 14th June 1793 was spent assembling the Channel Fleet in the anchorage off St Helens, Isle of Wight and on 14th, the fleet sailed from the anchorage and by 18th, were conducting manoeuvres off the Isles of Scilly.
On 23rd July 1793, the fleet anchored in Torbay. On 25th, Lord Howe received intelligence from an American merchantman who claimed to have sailed through a French fleet believed to be comprised of 17 ships of the line, about 30 miles west of Belle-Isle. Lord Howe immediately ordered the fleet to sea again and later that day, the fleet fell in with the 24 gun Sixth Rate Post-Ship HMS Eurydice, whose commander, Captain Francis Cole reported that he had received similar intelligence from a British privateer and that the French had stationed themselves off Belle-Isle in order to protect a convoy from the Caribbean which was expected at any time. Lord Howe then ordered his fleet to head for Belle-Isle, which they reached on 31st. At 14:00, the island was sighted and almost immediately thereafter, so was the enemy. Later that day, the ships of the line were ordered by Lord Howe to form a line of battle and to stand in towards the island. On 1st August, the French were again sighted and the British changed course to close the range, so that by noon, the enemy were so close that their hulls could be seen from the decks of the British ships. In the early afternoon, the wind died away to a dead calm. In the evening, a light breeze sprang up, which the British exploited to head directly at the enemy, but the coming of nightfall prevented the fleets from getting to grips with each other. Dawn on the 2nd August came and the French were nowhere to be seen. Over the next few days, the weather deteriorated significantly, to the point where Lord Howe and the fleet was forced to return to the shelter of Torbay.
On the 10th August 1793, Rear-Admiral MacBride was replaced in command of the squadron by Rear-Admiral Benjamin Caldwell.
On 23rd August 1793, the Channel Fleet again left Torbay, this time to escort the Newfoundland-bound convoy past any danger presented by the French and to await the arrival of the convoy from the West Indies. Having achieved both objectives and having spent another ten or twelve days on manoeuvres around the Isles of Scilly, the Channel Fleet again anchored in Torbay on 4th September 1793. They left Torbay again on 27th October, this time to cruise in the Bay of Biscay, looking for a fight with the French. At 09:00 on 18th November, the 18pdr armed 38 gun Frigate HMS Latona sighted a strange squadron upwind of her, which proved to be five French ships of the line, two frigates, a brig-corvette and a schooner. The French force continued to close with Lord Howe's fleet until, once more, they were clearly visible from the decks of the British ships. It would appear that the French squadron had mistaken the full force of the British Channel Fleet for a merchant convoy and had closed to intercept. On realising the full horror of their mistake, they very quickly turned tail and fled the scene. Lord Howe ordered his leading ships of the line, HMS Russell, HMS Bellerophon, HMS Defence, HMS Audacious and HMS Ganges (all of 74 guns), plus the frigates, to set all sail and chase the enemy. In gale-force winds and high seas, the British ships strained every inch of rigging in their determination to catch the enemy force and bring them to action, but very soon, the strain began to tell. HMS Russell sprang her fore-topmast and at 11:00, the fore and main-topmasts on HMS Defence collapsed and crashed down to the deck. Seeing that his ships of the line were struggling in the bad weather, Lord Howe changed his mind and instead ordered his frigates to continue the chase and keep the enemy in sight and lead the fleet. At a little after noon, the wind shifted a little and allowed the leading British frigate, the 18pdr armed 38 gun ship HMS Latona, to close the range and engage the two rear-most French frigates. By 4pm, HMS Latona was in a position to be able to cut off one of the enemy frigates and take her, but the French commander, Commodore Vanstabel in the Tigre of 74 guns bore down and stopped it. The Tigre and another French 74 gun ship passed close enough to HMS Latona to be able to fire full broadsides at the British frigate. Captain Edward Thornborough of HMS Latona was having none of this and luffed up (that is, steered his ship directly into the wind, stopping the ship dead in the water) and returned the French fire, cutting away the fore stay and main tack line of the Tigre as well as damaging her in her hull. None of the other British ships were able to get near and more ships suffered damage to their masts and rigging in the severe weather. HMS Vanguard (74) and HMS Montagu (74) both lost their main-topmasts. This convinced Lord Howe to call off the chase. After this skirmish, Lord Howe kept his fleet at sea until mid-December, when the Channel Fleet returned to Spithead.
Things continued in this vein with Lord Howe keeping his ships of the line out of harms way in Torbay or at the great fleet anchorages at Spithead or off St Helens, Isle of Wight and making occasional forays out into the Western Approaches and the Bay of Biscay. He relied on his Frigates to maintain a close blockade of the French Channel and Atlantic coasts and a chain of Sloops of War to maintain communications.
On the 13th March 1794, Captain Louis was appointed to command the brand-new Seventy-Four HMS Minotaur and was replaced in HMS Cumberland by Captain Bartholomew Samuel Rowley. Captain Rowley was the product of the sometimes blatant nepotism then extant in the Royal Navy. Born in 1764, he was the second son of Vice-Admiral Sir Joshua Rowley and the grandson of Admiral Sir William Rowley. Given this nepotism, it is perhaps not surprising that he was aged only 15 when he passed his Examination for Lieutenant on the 1st September 1779. He was appointed Master and Commander in the Sloop of War HMS Tobago on the 1st November 1780 and was still aged only 16 years and 7 months when he was Posted and appointed Captain in the Frigate HMS Resource (9pdr, 28). Despite his young age, relative inexperience and powerful patron, he nevertheless turned out to be a successful commander but was unemployed and on half-pay between paying off the Frigate HMS Diamond (12pdr, 32) in August of 1783 and being appointed to the Frigate HMS Penelope (12pdr, 32) in August of 1792.
Captain Rowley joined the ship at Chatham in August of 1794 and after a brief stop to take on powder and shot at the Blackstakes anchorage off Queenborough, the ship sailed to rejoin the Channel Fleet at Spithead. On the 23rd May 1795, HMS Cumberland sailed from Spithead as a reinforcement for the Mediterranean Fleet under Vice-Admiral Sir William Hotham and flew the command flag of Rear-Admiral Robert Man. On arrival in the Mediterranean, Rear Admiral Man was to hoist his command flag in the First Rate ship of the line HMS Victory and HMS Cumberland was to be a part of his squadron.
Hotham's fleet was a formidable force by this time and once HMS Cumberland joined, was comprised of:
The First Rate ships of the line HMS Britannia and HMS Victory (both of 100 guns), the Second Rate ships of the line HMS Windsor Castle, HMS St. George, HMS Princess Royal and HMS Blenheim (all of 98 guns), the Third Rate ships of the line HMS Gibraltar (80), HMS Captain, HMS Fortitude, HMS Bombay Castle, HMS Saturn, HMS Cumberland, HMS Terrible, HMS Defence, HMS Egmont, HMS Culloden, HMS Bedford, the ex-French HMS Courageux, HMS Audacious, the Neopolitan ships Guiscardo and Samnito (all of 74 guns), HMS Agamemnon and HMS Diadem (both of 64 guns), the Frigates HMS Meleager (12pdr, 32) and HMS Cyclops (9pdr, 28), the Post-Ship HMS Ariadne (9pdr, 24), the Sloops of War HMS Eclair (Ship-Sloop, 6pdr-armed, 18 guns), HMS Fleche (ex-French Brig-Sloop, 18pdr carronade-armed, 18 guns), the fireship HMS Comet (18pdr carronade-armed, 14 guns) and the Armed Cutter HMS Resolution (4pdr-armed, 14 guns).
After their engagement against the French at the Battle of Genoa on the 13th and 14th March 1795, in which ships of both sides had been damaged, both fleets withdrew to make repairs and to refit. On 4th July 1795, Hotham dispatched Captain Horatio Nelson in HMS Agamemnon in company with the HMS Meleager, the 24 gun ex-French post-ship HMS Moselle, HMS Ariadne and the 14 gun Cutter HMS Mutine to patrol off Genoa. Three days later, Nelson's small force ran into the French Toulon fleet, which immediately gave chase. The following day, HMS Agamemnon was closing with San Fiorenzo Bay in Corsica and the rest of the British fleet. At 07:20, HMS Agamemnon began firing signal guns to alert the fleet and two hours later, the French, having spotted 22 British ships of the line and several frigates in the bay, broke off the chase and headed off to the West. For Hotham, this was too good an opportunity to miss. The entire French Toulon fleet at sea, there for the taking, if he could get his ships to sea and bring them to action. The problem was that most of his ships were refitting or taking on water. but despite this, by 9pm the ships were under way. By noon on the 8th July, the fleet was heading west under all sail and on 12th, received intelligence concerning the whereabouts of the enemy, seen off the Iles de Hyeres off south-eastern France. That night, the fleet was battered by a storm which damaged the sails of several of the British ships. At daybreak the following day, the enemy were spotted. At 08:00, Vice-Admiral Hotham made the signal for a general chase and for his ships to take stations for mutual support and engage the enemy on bearing up with them in succession. Very quickly, the British ships were sailing under every scrap of canvas they could use and by noon, the leading British ships (HMS Victory, despite her size and her age, being 30 years old, was still one of the fastest ships in the Royal Navy, HMS Cumberland and HMS Culloden) were only three quarters of a mile from the rear of the enemy fleet. Such was the disorganised state of the British fleet following the previous night's storm that the rear-most of Hotham's ships were still eight miles away. At 12:30, a change in the wind allowed the three rear-most French ships to bring their guns to bear on the three leading British ships and a furious exchange of fire quickly followed. In less than an hour, the rear-most French ship, the Alcide, was seriously damaged and at 13:30, HMS Culloden's main-topmast was shot away. At 14:00, the Alcide surrendered to HMS Cumberland, but Captain Rowley decided not to take possession of her and put a prize crew aboard. He decided instead to move on to the next ship in the French line. The French frigates Alceste and Justice were sent to take the Alcide in tow, but were driven off by fire from HMS Victory. By now, more British ships were arriving on the scene and becoming engaged. At 14:42, HMS Blenheim, HMS Captain and HMS Defence began to exchange fire with the French rearguard, the Genereux, the ex-HMS Berwick, Tyrannicide and Aquilon (all of 74 guns).
It was at this time that Hotham signalled the fleet to discontinue the action. His reasons, given later, were that his fleet was too greatly scattered and that he feared that the French would overwhelm his vanguard before the rest of the fleet could catch up and support them. The decision to discontinue the action was and is still heavily criticised. Hotham's second-in-command, Rear Admiral Samuel Goodall flying his flag in HMS Princess Royal is reported to have kicked his hat across the quarterdeck in frustration and the then Captain Nelson wrote
"In the forenoon we had every prospect of taking every Ship in the Fleet; and at noon it was almost certain we should have the six near ships". Captain Rowley shared Nelson and Rear-Admiral Goodall's frustrations at Hotham's signal. Being heavily engaged at the vanguard of the British fleet, Rowley saw the benefit of continuing the action and initially refused to acknowledge Vice-Admiral Hotham's signal to break off until he received a direct order from Rear-Admiral Man in HMS Victory to do so.
Tragically, once the British began to break off the action, the Alcide caught fire and blew up taking about half her crew with her. The survivors were picked up by the British.
In the Action off Hyeres, HMS Cumberland took no casualties but suffered damage to her sails and rigging.
After the battle, the fleet withdrew firstly to San Fiorenzo and then to Leghorn (modern-day Livorno in Italy). Hotham's hesitation had given the French confidence in the Mediterranean and indeed a squadron of six French ships of the line were able to escape from Toulon on the 13th September of that year bound for Brest in order to replace the losses inflicted by the British in the Battle of Groix the previous June. Richery's force comprised the 80 gun ship Le Victoire, the 74 gun ships Barras, Jupiter, Resolution, Duquesne and the ex-HMS Berwick, together with three large frigates. On 22nd September, news reached Hotham of the French move and on 5th October, Rear-Admiral Man, who had previously beeon ordered to shift his flag from HMS Victory to HMS Windsor Castle with the rest of his squadron comprising HMS Cumberland, HMS Defence (74), HMS Terrible (74), HMS Audacious (74), HMS Saturn (74) plus the 18pdr armed 38 gun frigate HMS Blonde and the 12pdr armed 32 gun frigate HMS Castor were sent in pursuit. They were too late. On 7th October, off Cape St Vincent, Richery's force ran into a convoy which amongst other ships, included the ex-French HMS Censeur, badly damaged and captured at the Battle of Genoa and on her way back to the UK for repairs, which was recaptured by the French along with 30 of the convoy's merchantmen.
Rear-Admiral Man's squadron, including HMS Cumberland blockaded Richery in Cadiz and in November, Vice-Admiral Hotham tendered his resignation as Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean. Hotham was replaced in the role by Vice-Admiral Sir John Jervis. HMS Cumberland and the squadron remained off Cadiz until July of 1796 when he took the squadron back to San Fiorenzo to join Jervis and the fleet. This turned out to be a major mistake, the French Admiral Richery took advantage of the blockade being lifted and went on to create chaos in a commerce-raiding expedition off Newfoundland. On meeting with Jervis, who had chosen to command the fleet from HMS Victory, Read-Admiral Man had made the mistake of assuming that Jervis would resupply him from his own ships. Jervis however, was not one to tolerate fools and immediately sent Man and his squadron to Gibraltar to provision his ships and return.
On the 1st October 1796 whilst off Cape de Gata, Rear-Admiral Man and his squadron including HMS Cumberland were sighted and chased by a Spanish fleet of nineteen ships of the line but managed to make it under the guns of Gibraltar before the Spanish could get to grips with them. Once the Spanish were out of sight, Man decided to take the squadron and cruise off Cape St. Vincent. After a Captain's conference, Rear-Admiral Man concluded that the Spanish had headed east, into the Mediterranean and decided to ignore Vice-Admiral Jervis' orders and return with the squadron to Portsmouth.
Rear-Admiral Man's decision to abandon his station in the Mediterranean was widely condemned at the time. In doing so, he had deprived Vice-Admiral Jervis of a third of his strength. In December 1796, the squadron arrived off Portsmouth and Rear-Admiral Man was ordered to strike his flag and go ashore. He was never to receive another sea-going appointment, although he did manage to avoid a Court Martial for deliberately disobeying his superior officer's orders. Despite losing a third of his ships, Vice-Admiral Sir John Jervis still managed to comprehensively defeat the Spanish fleet on the 14th February 1797 at the Battle of Cape St. Vincent, even though he was outnumbered two-to-one.
On the voyage from Gibraltar to Portsmouth, HMS Cumberland lost contact with the rest of the squadron and didn't arrive at Portsmouth until the 30th December 1796 and was immediately put into quarantine as over 150 of her crew were sick with dysentery and typhus. HMS Cumberland was taken into the Royal Dockyard at Portsmouth for a refit in March of 1797 and the work was completed three months later at a cost of £18,154.
By the early spring of 1797 while HMS Cumberland was laying off Spithead awaiting orders, disaffection with their lot had spread amongst the sailors of the Channel Fleet and during routine movements of men between ships, plans had been laid to do something about it. A petition was raised and was sent to the retired Admiral Lord Howe, still greatly trusted and respected by the men. Lord Howe in turn, asked Rear-Admiral Lord Seymour to investigate whether or not the men were really that unhappy and Seymour reported back that this was not the case. Howe came to regard the petition as being the work of troublemakers and decided to ignore it, but sent a copy of it to Lord Spencer, First Lord of the Admiralty anyway. The men, on receiving no response from Lord Howe decided to put their plan into action and the men of the fleet flagship, the First Rate ship of the line HMS Royal George (100) were to begin what became known as the Great Mutiny at Spithead. On 15th April, Vice-Admiral Sir Alexander Hood, the Lord Bridport, Commander in Chief of the Channel Fleet, gave the order for the Channel Fleet to put to sea. Instead of weighing the anchors, the men of HMS Royal George ran into the rigging and gave three cheers. This was the signal for the mutiny to begin and as one, the men of every ship of the line of the Channel Fleet in the anchorage off St Helens, Isle of Wight, refused to weigh anchor as ordered. The captains and officers of the Channel Fleet were astonished at this unified act of disobedience and regardless of what was threatened, the men stood firm. On 16th April, the ships companies of the fleet each elected two delegates and agreed that meetings should take place in the Admirals quarters on the First Rate ship of the line HMS Queen Charlotte (100). The following day, all the men of the fleet were sworn to support the cause and halters were hung from the yards of the ships as a signal that the men meant business. Officers regarded as being overly oppressive were ordered ashore. On the same day, two petitions were drawn up, one for the Admiralty and one for Parliament. The petitions contained the men's demands, which were:
1 - that the 'pursers pound' (14 ounces instead of 16) be abolished and that their provisions be increased to the full 16 ounce pound.
2 - that their wages be increased (up to this point, the sailors of the Royal Navy had not had a pay rise for over a century)
3 - that vegetables instead of flour be served with beef
4 - that the sick be better attended to and that their necessities not be embezzled
5 - that the men, on returning from sea, be given a short period of shore leave to visit their families.
6 - that certain named officers be withdrawn from sea service or replaced on account of their cruelty and/or incompetence - a group which included Captain Rowley of HMS Cumberland.
7 - that an Act of Indemnity be passed by the Parliament and that the King issue a Royal Pardon to everyone involved.
8 - that they would not weigh anchor unless either the French were directly threatening the UK or until their demands were met.
The Great Mutiny is so-called because the sailors refused to obey orders to put to sea. The ringleaders of the Mutiny were clearly intelligent men with an eye on the public perception of their acts. They decided that only the Channel Fleet's ships of the line would be affected. Frigates and smaller vessels were still needed to escort convoys past the dangers presented by French naval units and privateers, so their crews continued with their duties as normal. In addition, the mutineers announced that although they were refusing to put to sea, they would return to duty if the French appeared off the coast. All other aspects of naval discipline were maintained.
'Mutiny' is defined as a deliberate refusal to obey orders and in that sense, the Great Mutiny meets the narrowest definition of the word. In it's effects however, the Great Mutiny was actually more akin to a strike over pay and conditions. The mutineers were what would today be called 'media savvy' in that they did not give the Government anything which could be used to turn public opinion against them.
On being put ashore, Captain Rowley lodged with a tradesman, rent free, on condition that the tradesman have exclusive rights to supply HMS Cumberland's crew with slop clothing. When the tradesman was pulled out to the ship to claim his payment from HMS Cumberland, he was chased off by an armed boat.
Lord Howe had in the meantime come out of retirement and was acting as the intermediary between the delegates, the Admiralty and the Government. He was hugely respected by all sides and had been going backward and forward between Portsmouth and London as the negotiations progressed. On 14th May Lord Howe returned from London bringing with him the requested Act of Parliament and having been granted the authority to settle the dispute. In addition, he brought with him a Royal Proclamation of a pardon for all involved in the Mutiny. The Act of Parliament basically granted all the men's requests. At 10:00 on 16th May, the Great Mutiny at Spithead finally ended when the ships of the Channel Fleet at Spithead put to sea.
As part of their conditions for returning to duty, the crew of HMS Cumberland had demanded that Captain Rowley be removed from command, so in July 1797, Captain Rowley was replaced in command by Captain Robert Montagu. Captain Rowley's next appointment was in command of another Seventy-Four, HMS Ramillies. Captain Bartholomew Rowley was promoted to Rear-Admiral on the 14th Februry 1799 and ended his career as Commander in Chief at Jamaica with the rank of Admiral. He died from a virulent fever in Kingston, Jamaica on the 7th October 1810.
Captain Robert Montagu was another veteran of the American War. Born in 1763, he had passed his Examination for Lieutenant on the 5th April 1779 and had been appointed Master and Commander in the ex-French ship-rigged Sloop of War HMS Chaser of 18 guns by Admiral Sir Edward Hughes on the 1st January 1781. HMS Chaser had previously been the French privateer corvette Le Chasseur. Montagu only held the post for three months until he was posted and appointed by Admiral Hughes as captain in the Post-Ship HMS Seahorse of 24 guns. Montagu had participated in Admiral Hughes' campaign against the French Admiral le Baillie de Suffren. His appointment prior to HMS Cumberland had been in command of another Seventy-Four, HMS Hector. Captain Montagu was the eldest of five children of the Earl of Sandwich and his mistress, Miss Marta Ray. On Captain Montagu's appointment, HMS Cumberland became flagship to Vice-Admiral George Keith Elphinstone, the Lord Keith. Under Captain Montagu and Lord Keith, HMS Cumberland remained in the Channel Fleet, tasked with the ongoing blockade of the French Atlantic coast. Captain Montagu was to remain with HMS Cumberland until the 14th February 1799, when he was promoted to Rear-Admiral and appointed as Commander-in-Chief at Jamaica. Lord Keith had left the ship the previous year on being appointed second in command of the Channel Fleet and hoisting his command flag in HMS Queen Charlotte.
Captain Montagu's replacement in HMS Cumberland was Captain Sir Thomas Graves. Graves had been born in 1747 and had entered the Royal Navy as a child, in common with most of his brother officers. He had passed his Examination for Lieutenant on 31st March 1782 and was appointed Master and Commander in the 16-gun ship-rigged Sloop of War HMS Rattlesnake on the 22nd November 1790. He was first Posted and appointed as Captain in the Post-Ship HMS Camilla of 20 guns on the 19th March 1794. At the same time he was appointed into HMS Cumberland, the ship became flagship to Rear-Admiral Sir Richard Hussey Bickerton, the Second Baronet Bickerton of Upton, second in command of His Majesty's ships at Portsmouth. Rear-Admiral Bickerton was the son of the ship's earlier commander, Sir Richard Bickerton, the First Baronet.
Rear-Admiral Bickerton moved his command flag to the 44-gun two-decker HMS Gladiator in February of 1800 and on 1st January 1801, Captain Graves was promoted to Rear-Admiral and left the ship to raise his command flag in the Third Rate ship of the line HMS Polyphemus(64). He was to serve as Second in Command to Nelson at the Battle of Copenhagen later in 1801.
It was reported in January of 1801 that Captain Robert Carthew Reynolds would be HMS Cumberland's next commanderbut on the ship receiving orders to go to the West Indies, Captain Reynolds instead was ordered to recommission HMS Orion (74) for the Channel Fleet. Instead, Mr James Katon, Lieutenant in the Second Rate ship of the line HMS Princess Royal (98) was appointed Acting Captain in HMS Cumberland with orders to take the ship to the West Indies, whereupon he would be replaced by Captain Henry William Bayntun. Bayntun was ordered to hand over command of HMS Carnatic (74) to Mr Katon, who was to take the ship back to the UK. On his return to the UK in HMS Carnatic, Mr Katon was appointed Master and Commander in the 14-gun Hired Armed Lugger Lark.
Captain Bayntun had first gone to the Caribbean at the beginning of the war back in 1793 as a Lieutenant in the store ship HMS Ulysses. Appointed Lieutnant in the Second Rate ship of the line HMS Boyne (98), flagship of the Commander-in-Chief, Vice-Admiral Sir John Jervis. As a reward for his skill, daring and courage during Jervis' successful invasion of Martinique, the Vice-Admiral had made Mr Bayntun Master and Commander in the Sloop of War HMS Avenger. Bayntun was Posted and appointed to command the Frigate HMS Resource (9pdr, 29) on the 4th May 1794.
The French Revolutionary War was ended by the Treaty of Amiens, signed on 27th March 1802. With the end of the war, the Royal Navy began the process of drawing down the fleet. Also, Stations like that at Jamaica were downgraded and were not considered important enough to warrant a full Flag Officer as Commander in Chief. Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Montagu, HMS Cumberland's former commander, was ordered home and Captain Bayntun as the senior commander remaining on the station was ordered to raise a Commodore's Broad Pennant in HMS Cumberland and take over running the Royal Navy's affairs in the West Indies.
The Peace of Amiens was only to last fourteen months with Britain, France and Spain bickering over the concessions they had unwillingly made for the sake of ending the war. Finally, after months of threat and counter-threat over both sides not complying with Treaty obligations, Britain declared war on France, starting the Napoleonic Wars. With the resumption of hostilities, Commodore Bayntun immediately implemented a blockade of French possessions in the Caribbean. Commodore Bayntun's squadron at this point comprised, in addition to his flagship HMS Cumberland, the ships of the line HMS Theseus, HMS Bellerophon, HMS Elephant, HMS Vanguard and HMS Goliath (all of 74 guns), the ex-French Frigate HMS Desiree (18pdr, 36), HMS Tartar (18pdr, 32), the Sloops of War HMS Shark (ship-rigged, 6pdr-armed, 16 guns), HMS Echo (ship-rigged, 32pdr carronade-armed, 18 guns) and HMS Calypso )ship-rigged, 6pdr-armed, 16 guns).
On the 28th June 1803, HMS Cumberland was patrolling off Cape St. Nicholas Mole on theisland of San Domingo in company with HMS Goliath and the ex-French Seventy-Four HMS Hercule (which had recently arrived from the UK under Lieutenant John B Hills in the role of Acting Captain) when strange sails were sighted which turned out to be the French 24pdr-armed Heavy Frigate Poursuivate of 40 guns and the corvette Mignonne (ship-rigged, 18pdr-armed, 16 guns). Commodore Bayntun ordered HMS Goliath to give chase to the corvette and made short work of the French ship which was taken into the Royal Navy under her French name. HMS Hercule was ordered after the large and powerful Frigate which when the apparently faster Seventy Four caught up, put up a fierce fight against the British ship of the line and escaped into the harbour under the shore batteries.
Two days later, HMS Cumberland was in company with HMS Vanguard when they sighted a large French Frigate, La Creole of 40 guns. Both British ships gave chase, but HMS Vanguard was to open fire first. After HMS Vanguard had fired two full broadsides into the French Frigate and recieved one in turn, the Frenchman surrendered. It turned out that the French ship was carrying 500 or so troops and had had some of her guns removed to make room for the soldiers who had been ordered back to France. La Creole was taken to Port Royal, Jamaica for the repairs required to put her into British service.
During the course of October 1803, HMS Cumberland intercepted a number of American ships off Cuba which were carrying French troops who had been evacuated from San Domingo following the slave uprising there. After disarming the French troops, Commodore Bayntun sent them on their way.
On the 11th December 1803, HMS Cumberland left Jamaica in company with a convoy and the now-HMS Creole. The repairs to HMS Creole failed and on the 2nd January 1804 in mid-Atlantic, the ship became so leaky that she was abandoned and burned. HMS Cumberland and her convoy arrived safely at Plymouth on the 24th January. Captain Bayntun was immediately ordered to take command of and recommission HMS Leviathan (74), and he was to command that ship at the Battle of Trafalgar in October of 1805.
Captain Bayntun's replacement in HMS Cumberland was Captain John Serrell. He wasn't to remain in command for very long. On the 21st February 1804, he was ordered to pay off HMS Cumberland.
With the resumption of war, the Royal Navy faced a major problem in that ships of the lie were being taken out of service due to age and decay faster than they were being replaced with new ships. This was because there had been no large-scale program of building ships of the line during the French Revolutionary War. Furthermore, the Navy Board had been bogged down in disputes over pricing with existing commercial ship-builders and the Royal Dockyards were all running flat out with the repair and maintenance of the increasingly aged fleet. This wasn't helped by the fact that Admiral Lord St. Vincent, during his term as First Lord of the Admiralty between 1801 and 1804 had alienated many in the Royal Dockyards with his attempts at stamping out corruption. When Henry Dundas, the First Viscount Melville took over as First Lord in 1804, the situation was getting desperate. There were not enough ships at sea to meet the threats from France and her allies and radical measures were needed to rectify it. Lord Melville had to fix the problems with low morale in the Royal Dockyards and in the Navy Board and repair relations with the commercial shipbuilders. His main priority though was to get ships repaired and back at sea. The problem was that the traditional method of repairing old ships was to replace rotten or worn out timbers with new and this was time-consuming, inefficient and expensive. The solution came from the Honourable East India Company. This huge organisation maintained its own fleet of heavily-armed, very large vessels and their Surveyor, Gabriel Snodgrass had invented a system of extending the lives of old and worn out ships which could be done very quickly and very cheaply. Instead of the traditional method, the East India Company had merely built a new lower hull over the old one (a process called 'Doubling') and had strengthened the frame by using iron straps to reinforce the knees, where the beams meet the frames, bolted through. In addition, internal diagonal bracing was fitted to reinforce the whole frame. Using this method, a ship could be repaired in weeks rather than months. Lord Melville knew that he would face significant resistance from the Royal Dockyards, so sent Sir Andrew Snape Hammond, the Comptroller of the Navy Board and Sir William Rule, the Surveyor, to Portsmouth and Plymouth, with instructions that Portsmouth as to repair eleven ships and Plymouth nine - in a year. The iron straps themselves were to be fabricated at the Woolwich Royal Dockyard and taken by sea to Portsmouth and Plymouth.
HMS Cumberland was taken into the Royal Dockyard at Plymouth to be surveyed, but was found to be beyond repair due to age and decay. Later in 1804, she was broken up.
